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nected even if they display temporal gappiness. But if the tx and t4
stages are gen-identical, as are the tx and t5 stages, then given
transitivity, so must the t4 and t5 stages be gen-identical. But in fact
the t4 stage is definitely not a stage of the same object as the t5
stage. Consider, first, that these stages share no parts in common.
Secondly, the later stage at t5 does not derive from the earlier
stage at t4 by way of gradual parts' replacement. Finally, and most
importantly for the Causal theory, the t4 stage is not causally
connected in any way to the t5 stage. This last fact alone
guarantees that the Causal theory will judge that these stages are
not stages of the same object. But, as we have seen, transitivity
considerations require that these stages be gen-identical. The non-
branching condition as formulated above will not protect the
Causal theory from this violation of transitivity since in this
example not more than one stage at the same time stands in relation
R to an earlier stage.
What this type of case shows is that an adequate nonbranching
clause must be formulated to exclude more than the possibility of
simultaneous gen-identical stages (which are non-i?-related). This
case shows that given the possibility of gaps, there can exist
branching causal paths, even though there are no simultaneous
competing candidates for gen-identity with an earlier stage. The
nonbranching rule should read as follows: x and z are gen-
identical only if there does not exist some stage y such that x is R-
related to y but z is not i?-related to y, or such that z is i?-related
to y but x is not /^-related to y. This version of the nonbranching
rule is broader in scope tlian the earlier version considered and is
sufficient to handle the kind of case described here.1
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ON OMNISCIENCE AND A 'SET OF ALL TRUTHS':
A REPLY TO BRINGSJORD
By PATRICK GRIM
IN a number of pieces I have tried to present what I see as quitebasic Cantorian problems for any set of all truths and for
omniscience (see [4], [5], [6], [7]). In 'Grim on Logic and Omni-
science' [2] Selmer Bringsjord suggests two escape routes. I think it
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I
Bringsjord takes the power set axiom to be at the core of the Can-
torian difficulties at issue, and the first escape he offers is simply
to do without it: to adopt an alternative set theory such as ZF-
Power in which such an axiom doesn't appear. 'Such a move
vitiates, in one blow, the cottage industry that Grim has helped
develop out of the power set axiom.' (p. 187)
This is not the first time such an escape has been suggested: in
[13] Christopher Menzel proposed ZF-Power in particular as a
solution for Cantorian problems plaguing a set of all truths appro-
priate to any given possible world.
Not too surprisingly, sacrifice of the power set axiom results in
quite major technical limitations. At a single blow, for example, we
are exiled forever from Cantor's paradise. Bringsjord, though fully
aware of the major technical limitations at issue, thinks they're
something we simply have to live with: an unfortunate cost of the
need to maintain a set of all truths.
The truth of the matter, however — as I tried to indicate in my
reply to Menzel ([5]) —is that even sacrifice of the power set axiom
isn't enough to escape Cantorian difficulties regarding a set of all
truths. We'd have to sacrifice significantly more.
Here the argument is as follows.
Let us suppose we did have a set T of all truths within ZF-Power.
Then by the axiom schema of separation, carried over directly
from ZF, we would have as a subset of T a set of all truths satisfy-
ing a particular condition B(x). As long as our basic language is
rich enough to express the notion that a truth t is about a topic c,
it appears, one such condition will be 'x is about a set of truths.' By
separation, then, we would have a set C of all truths about sets of
truths.
More formally, using 'Axy' to indicate that x is about y, our con-
dition 'x is about a set of truths' is:
3y\/z(z^y => z^T.8c Axy).
The axiom schema of separation, taken directly from ZF, is
where zx, ..., zn are the free variables of B(x) other than x, and the
only restriction on B(x) is that it does not contain y as a free
variable (see for example [11], p. 175). Using Tfor a in this schema
and our condition above for B(x) would give us a set C of all
truths about sets of truths:
y\/z(z^y => z^T.8c Axy)).
The existence of a set C, however, would give us a reductio. C
would, in particular, be larger than T. For consider any one-to-one
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sets of truths, and consider further a set c' of all truths which do
not belong to the sets their assigned element is about. Here using
la(f(x)Y to indicate the set (or union of sets) f(x) is about,
xGc' = x(=T8cx&a(f(x)).
Clearly C will contain some truth about c' just as it contains some
truth regarding any set of truths. But by familiar reasoning / can
assign no element of T to any truth about c'. C is larger than T.
One branch of the reductio, then, is this: given a set T of all
truths, it appears, there would be a subset C larger than the set T
of which it is a subset.1
Another branch is this. Each element of C is a truth. There are
thus more truths than elements of T, and thus T cannot, as
assumed, be a set of all truths.
As an escape from the Cantorian difficulties of C, then,
Bringsjord's appeal to ZF-Power proves insufficient. Something
above and beyond the power set axiom would have to be sacri-
ficed. Perhaps additional restrictions on the axiom schema of
separation are called for. Perhaps the language of the system must
exclude or restrict the notion of truths about sets of truths —
though since there clearly are truths about any sets of truths this
would seem far from satisfactory. Or perhaps we should simply
conclude that there is no set of all truths.
II
The second escape Bringsjord offers, with an eye to saving omni-
science in particular, is to challenge the following definition of
omniscience:
Df. 1 Vx(x is omniscient 3 Vp(p is true = Kxp)).
That such a definition is worthy of challenge I have no doubt; as
indicated in [3] this definition clearly won't do as an adequate
characterization of a traditional God's knowledge, and for that
reason I have standardly avoided it. One problem is this: that a
being might qualify as omniscient on such a definition and yet
hold any number of false beliefs. What such a definition requires is
that all truths be known by an omniscient being, and that all
things known by such a being be true. Since falsehoods believed
by such a being are neither truths nor things known, however,
such a definition puts no effective restrictions on the false beliefs
of an omniscient being.2
'Note that this is not a problem for sets in ZF-Power in general: the argument
relies essentially on the supposition that T is a set of all truths.
2 In order to qualify as omniscient and yet hold false beliefs, of course, a being B
would have to hold contradictory beliefs, and would moreover have to know that
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This is not however the challenge that Bringsjord presses
against Df. 1. His attempt is rather to defend omniscience by pro-
posing that it be redefined as follows:
Df. 2 s is omniscient = dfV/?(OKSjjb = Ksp),
claiming that
it's not unreasonable to maintain that there are certain true proposi-
tions God can't possibly know, such as what it's like to be ignorant,
finite, shortsighted, etc...I think it's safe to say that there well may be
propositional knowledge lurking here...it may very well be, for exam-
ple, that I know that being a finite creature is like [...], where [...] can
be filled in in such a way that a genuine proposition is denoted. ([2],
p. 188)
One peculiarity here is of course that Bringsjord's defence of
omniscience is on the grounds that there are true propositions
which God does not and cannot know. Surely that alone would
seem enough to compromise a traditional notion of omniscience.
There are several further problems that are bound to plague
such an approach as well, however.
Putting the details of Bringsjord's definition aside for a moment,
consider simply the kind of being he is trying to invoke here: a
divine being which knows, well, not everything, but everything
metaphysically suitable to such a being; a being which knows
everything except, say, those propositions knowable only from the
shortcoming, mess-making perspective of finitude.
A major difficulty is that even such a radically re-conceived
'omniscient' being would fall victim to the kind of Cantorian argu-
ment at issue. Here for convenience I will again phrase the argu-
ment in terms of a power set, though the lesson of section I is that
it might also be phrased without it.
Consider the set of all truths that a divine being such as
Bringsjord intends would know — the set T of all p such that Ksp,
where we are careful to exclude supposedly propositional self-
knowledge of finitude, shortcoming, mess-making, and the like.
Consider further all subsets of T, elements of the power
For each such subset there will be a distinct set-theoretical truth —
a truth to the effect that a chosen truth T ^ a member of that set,
for example, or a truth to the effect that it is not. By Cantor's
theorem, then, there will be more set-theoretical truths regarding
membership in subsets of T than there are truths in T: there will
be set-theoretical truths that T leaves out.
But set-theoretical truths are certainly not the kinds of short-
coming, mess-making propositions that are knowable only from a
recognize that he holds contradictory beliefs, however, he could nonetheless
qualify as omniscient in the sense defined; nothing in the definition requires that
an omniscient being avoid even blatantly obvious contradiction. For further dis-
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perspective of finitude; these are precisely the kinds of truths all of
which Bringsjord's being would be expected to know. The lesson of
the Cantorian argument, however, is that given any set of all
truths any being knows, there will be truths it does not — truths
knowledge of which would moreover be perfectly appropriate the
sort of being Bringsjord intends. If Cantorian difficulties pose a
problem for a traditional notion of omniscience, then, they pose
just as much of a problem for Bringsjord's. The escape fails.
Here the argument has been constructed in terms of the recon-
ception of an omniscient being Bringsjord has in mind, however,
rather than the one he strictly defines. Df. 2 itself faces further dif-
ficulties.
Within Bringsjord's definition, God is intended to qualify as
omniscient, even if he doesn't know all true propositions, on the
grounds that he knows all that is possible for a being of his sort to
know. Here Bringsjord quite consciously models his account on
definitions of omnipotence in which God is claimed to be omni-
potent on the grounds not that he can do literally anything, but
that he can do all that is possible for a being of his sort to do. It's
not particularly surprising, then, that Bringsjord's definition will
also face many of the same difficulties that plague such definitions
of omnipotence.
Consider in this light a being Necessary Mclg, essentially such
that he knows only that he is conscious. Mclg, on the definition
Bringsjord offers, would qualify as omniscient.3
Worse still, consider any being which is essentially such that it is
non-conscious — here a boulder qualifies, perhaps, or tomato juice
or the Pacific Ocean.4 For any such being Bringsjord's definition
would hold, and we'd be committed to the omniscience of tomato
juice.
Ill
There are areas relevant to the Cantorian argument against a set
of all truths or against omniscience, I think, that are well worthy of
further critical scrutiny. One of these Bringsjord mentions in a
footnote: the issue of set-theoretical semantics for propositional
quantification.
3Necessary Mclg is here patterned on Necessary McEar, a refinement in Bruce
Reichenbach's [15] of an example that appears in Plantinga's [14]. Classics
regarding this type of problem for omnipotence clearly include [10] and [12], and
it continues to play a major role in for example [17] and [8]. A more sophisticated
recent treatment of 'maximal omnipotence' in terms of an ability to accomplish
'shareable' tasks appears in C. Anthony Anderson's [1].
4Here I am obliged to L. Theresa Watkins for discussion. A similar problem
posed for certain definitions of omnipotence by stones and other inanimate
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What Bringsjord claims to offer, however, are two ways of escap-
ing the basic Cantorian argument. Neither of these succeeds.
State University of New York at Stony Brook,
Stony Brook, New York 11794-3750, U.S.A.
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